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American Railroad Accounting Practices
American railroad accounting practic-
es in the mid-nineteenth century
William Zimmermann
Introduction
 The nineteenth century was a significant time for the 
United States and for American business. The United States 
emerged as a world power in this century, evolving from a fledg-
ling coastal state into a continental giant. Much of this geopo-
litical expansion was fueled through the rapid growth of the 
American economy. In order to understand how the American 
economy was transformed, it is first helpful to understand how 
American business was transformed. This research paper seeks 
to answer this question by analyzing the accounting practices 
of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century. Accounting is the 
language of business and can be used to analyze the dynamics 
of mid-nineteenth century business. Contemporarily, managers, 
investors, and regulators use accounting-based financial reports 
to try to better understand a firm’s operations and economic 
situation. Therefore, financial reports and commentary on them 
from the period will yield critical knowledge on how different 
economic agents (managers, investors, creditors, regulators, and 
others) interacted and communicated with each other in the 
adolescent phase of both American capitalism and corporate 
culture.
 The railroad industry was chosen because it was the 
most significant industry of the mid-nineteenth century and 
perhaps the most significant industry of the whole period. 
Railroads were the first to adopt a corporate business organi-
zation that would later mature to the corporate organization 
recognizable today. The reason the railroad industry adopted 
large corporate structures was its need to raise large amounts of 
capital. Railroads needed to construct and maintain hundreds 
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of miles of track, purchase expensive engines, and build stations 
to operate the tracks. Railroad managers turned to the public to 
find both investors and creditors in order to afford the massive 
initial costs required to start railroad. Since the investors were 
the actual owners of the railroad, managers needed to integrate 
investors into the administration of the firm. This was done al-
most exclusively through forming a corporation, with investors 
electing a board of directors to appoint managers. The number 
of investors and size of railroads made them massive organiza-
tions, and the capital needs and scope of railroads led to further 
development of the corporate form of business organization. A 
critically important feature of the American economy’s growth 
in the nineteenth century was the maturation and widespread 
adoption of corporations in the United States. Since railroads 
were the most influential corporations of the mid-nineteenth 
century, it is logical to focus on them to understand the wider 
economy. Finally, focusing on the mid-nineteenth century will 
be insightful because it was the period where annual reports 
became truly sophisticated while also remaining unstandardized 
by national legislation. Railroads weren’t universally regulated 
by the federal government until the passage of the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887 and annual reports weren’t standardized 
until 1906 with the passage of the Hepburn Act, although the 
federal government did have some reporting requirements for 
railroads that received federal money. Instead, individual states 
had a wide variety of regulations and requirements for financial 
reporting. Since an important theme of the nineteenth-century 
American economy was the early development of modern busi-
ness, understanding how firms acted without strict guidelines or 
standards will be especially valuable.
 Financial reporting developed significantly in this peri-
od, prompted by the demands of corporations such as railroads. 
While financial information had been considered proprietary 
during most of the First Industrial Revolution, it was necessary 
for railroads to report this information publicly to their owners 
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– the shareholders. This rapid development in the sophistication 
of financial reporting was driven both by the legal requirements 
of the federal and state governments and by the demands of 
investors. During this period, the novelty of financial reporting 
and the lack of standardization meant that managers were able 
to experiment greatly with how reports were made. Occasion-
ally, this allowed unscrupulous managers to create misleading or 
fraudulent reports. For the most part, however, financial reports 
of this period were impressively informative and enlightening. 
Accounting theory also reached high levels of sophistication, 
although it was inhibited by a lack of standardization. This 
lack of standardization incentivized managers to choose the ac-
counting methods that reflected well on the firm over methods 
that reflected the real economic situation. Much like today, 
financial reports were primarily focused on the status of the 
company and its profitability. Annual reports usually contained 
only information on the balance sheet and income statement. 
Since railroads usually used a cash basis, the income statement 
somewhat mirrored the cash flows from operating activities, 
which could be used to evaluate the firm’s ability to pay debt 
and distribute dividends. Managers also used accounting to bet-
ter understand their operations and gather detailed statistical 
summaries. Similar to how investors used accounting to evalu-
ate a firm, managers often used these figures to aid in strategic 
decision making. Overall, railroad accounting in this period was 
impressively sophisticated.
Federal and State Requirements for Financial Reports
 In contemporary America, anyone familiar with busi-
ness has some familiarity with a Form 10-K. In the United 
States and most modern economies, financial reporting for 
public companies is a strictly regulated and standardized prac-
tice. Governments and standard setting authorities have created 
detailed methods on how a firm should assemble and present 
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its books to regulators and investors. Beyond government au-
thorities, groups like the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) have created detailed rules on how to prepare financial 
statements. These rules, US GAAP from FASB and IFRS from 
IASB, have been made by regulators to be the standard method 
for accounting in public companies. However ubiquitous now, 
this state of affairs should not be taken for granted. Rigorous 
and detailed accounting standards did not exist in the mid-
nineteenth century. 
 Since their inception, railroads have been closely con-
nected to the federal and state governments. The federal and 
state governments were very interested in the development and 
success of railroad companies, because populating and connect-
ing America’s quickly expanding territory required an extensive 
infrastructural network. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a state charter was usually required or de-
sired for incorporation, so most railroads wanted some level of 
state recognition. Therefore, both the federal and state govern-
ments were very involved in the establishment and funding of 
railroads; meanwhile, other investors welcomed government 
participation as a means to receive a favorable charter and con-
tinued state support. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or ‘the 
B&O,’ provides an excellent example of how this close relation-
ship between state governments and railroads was reflected in 
railroad accounting. When the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or 
the B&O, was created, “civic pride rather than profits made the 
B&O from its origin a ‘community enterprise’.”1 Beyond civic 
pride, the B&O almost functioned as a state company and “in 
granting the charter for incorporating the B&O, the Maryland 
legislature retained the authority to set rates… [and] exempted 
the railroad from tax.”2 The railroad’s charter played a very sig-
nificant role in developing financial reporting in railroads and 
beyond. When B&O was incorporated, “the B&O Charter… 
required that stockholders be issued an annual ‘Statement 
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of Affairs.’”3 However, that was the limit of the detail in the 
statutory requirement. Impressively, this ‘Statement of Affairs’ 
evolved from “a five-page letter from the president to the inves-
tors” in 1827 into an impressively sophisticated annual report 
that included “the first modern example of a private corpora-
tion reporting revenues and expenses to stockholders” in 1832.4 
Therefore, the business environment in which railroads devel-
oped not only legally required some form of financial reporting, 
but also encouraged the development of sophisticated account-
ing and reports.
 The federal government also fostered the development 
of financial reporting through statutes and requirements. Simi-
lar to the states, the widespread and generous use of federal 
funds in supplying capital to railroads prompted the federal 
government to legally require railroads to provide vital informa-
tion regarding their operations and status. In 1862, Congress 
passed the renowned Pacific Railroad Act, which enabled the 
Treasury to issue bonds to railroads for the construction of a 
transcontinental railroad. In Section 20 of the legislation, the 
government required railroads to
            5
 The complex and detailed requirements of this legisla-
tion demonstrates that the annual reports were, indeed, becom-
ing more and more sophisticated. Further, the evolution of 
[submit to] the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report 
wherein shall be … First. The names of the stockhold-
ers… Second. The names and residences of the direc-
tors… Third. The amount of stock subscribed, and the 
amount thereof actually paid in… Fourth. A description 
of the lines of road surveyed, of the lines thereof fixed 
upon for the construction of the road, and the cost of 
such surveys ; Fifth. The amount received from passen-
gers on the road ; Sixth. The amount received for freight 
thereon ; Seventh. A statement of the expense of said road 
and its fixtures ; Eighth. A statement of the indebtedness 
of said company, setting forth the various kinds thereof.
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the required information from the annual reports of the B&O 
charter to the requirements here reveals that governments were 
becoming more exacting in the reports they received, acting 
as both investors and regulators. Outlined in the legislation, 
regulators were requiring the railroads to report on their capital 
structure, their revenue and expenses, and the current lines they 
were developing or operating.
 By 20 years later, railroads had already become the 
largest business in the world. Pursuant to statutory reporting 
requirements, the Auditor of Railroad Accounts sent the Sec-
retary of the Interior an annual report containing information 
on all railroads that had received some form of federal aid. This 
report contained vital information on what financial reports re-
ally consisted of in the mid-nineteenth century. In Appendix E 
of the report, there were three forms the railroads were required 
to submit. These were Form No. 8-001, essentially the balance 
sheet, Form No. 8-002, a report on the financial and statisti-
cal status of the railroad, and Form No. 8-003, essentially the 
income statement.6 Remarkably, annual reports had evolved in 
the span of just a few decades from brief letters to complex logs 
analogous with modern reports. Contained in the 1880 Annual 
Report of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts, many railroads’ 
financials were displayed in such a way that even modern read-
ers can have some grasp of their business’ operations and status. 
That ability is the power of financial reports.
 Both the federal and state governments mandated the 
creation of financial reports for several reasons. Governments’ 
financial stakes in many railroads is an obvious reason. Much 
like other shareholders, governments hoped to ensure that 
their investments, grants, or other forms of aid were being used 
wisely by management to promote the development and success 
of the firm. Another reason for governments to observe rail-
roads’ businesses through financial reporting was due to the use 
of railroads as a quasi-state agency. As previously discussed, the 
government often had the authority to decide the rates railroads 
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could charge or limit the profit margins of a firm. This was 
done purposefully because governments saw the railroad as a 
means of promoting commerce and economic activity in the re-
gion. This was the tradeoff that firms faced when they accepted 
governmental investments. The state vigorously promoted the 
expansion of railroads but did this in order to pursue additional 
economic and political objectives. Managers, who were content 
with receiving government aid, also had to accept this level of 
oversight. 
 The development of financial reports is an important 
piece of evidence in revealing this relationship. This is a very 
significant observation about the origins of American corpora-
tions. The government participated in an intimate way with 
the creation and funding of the first American corporations. 
This differs greatly from the free-market ideology or politics as-
sociated with American corporate culture today. Early railroads 
were often created and incorporated by legislatures and later 
railroads received significant funding from the federal and state 
governments in order to achieve government goals, which were 
partially aligned with private investors. Therefore, from its be-
ginning financial reporting was not only just a method to rem-
edy information asymmetries between managers and investors 
but was also a mechanism allowing the government to watch 
over and control industries it identified as nationally significant.
Management – Goals and Uses for Financial Reports
 Although the practice of reporting was required under 
legal statutes, managers had a great deal of flexibility in how 
they created their annual reports, as comprehensive industry 
standards like US GAAP or IFRS had yet to be introduced. 
Since managers had such a high degree of agency over their 
reports, studying the various reporting methods used by man-
agers can reveal their differentiated prerogatives with financial 
reporting. Managers had to report the status of the business to 
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regulators and investors, but they were often at the liberty of ad-
justing their accounting methods to make their firm look more 
attractive. Perhaps most interestingly, it seems that managers 
also used the creation of annual reports and detailed accounting 
to inform themselves about their firm’s financial situation. In a 
time before the internet and data science, managers could often 
be unaware of many of the details of the railroad’s operations. 
Therefore, managers often created detailed microeconomic 
analyses of their business while making their financials. Much 
like investors, managers were able to use detailed information 
on their earnings and operations for strategic decision making.
 Early railroad managers’ chief difficulty in creating an-
nual reports lies in the lack of precedents in business. Unlike 
contemporary CEO’s and CFO’s, they were never exposed to 
a Form 10-K in a business school class. Instead, many railroad 
executives chose to mimic existing firms’ annual reports. Since 
the B&O was the oldest railroad in the United States, it “was 
known as ‘the B&O University’ and its annual reports were 
viewed as textbooks about railroading, and engineering and 
financial developments disclosed were closely followed by other 
railroads.”7 Again, the influence of regulators can be seen, for 
the Maryland legislature’s reporting requirements impacted the 
practices of railroads far outside of the state. This mimicking 
highlights that while there was great variety in annual reporting, 
managers were not operating in a bubble and industry standards 
did exist within a range of acceptability.
 The formal arrangement of three primary statements 
(the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash 
flows) did not yet exist but reports generally contained sub-
stantial information for all three categories. Firms seem to have 
almost universally presented a balance sheet (listing assets, li-
abilities, and stockholders’ equity) and an income statement 
with revenues and expenses. The combination of the balance 
sheet and income statement captured some of the information 
typically found in a statement of cash flows since “initially most 
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railroad accounting records were kept on a cash basis.”8 The 
primary focus of managers seems to have been reporting and 
analyzing their revenues and expenses. Similar to contemporary 
managerial focuses on ‘free cash flow’ and EBITDA, railroad 
managers of the mid-nineteenth century were deeply interested 
in their ability to generate cash to fund expansions and pay 
dividends and “as a result their reports primarily dealt with the 
sources and disposition of cash and with statistical measure of 
the flow of traffic.”9 How firms measured their revenues and 
expenses, which was an approximation of cash flow, had sig-
nificant implications for their reported profitability. All of these 
reports together (the balance sheet, income statement, and sta-
tistical analysis) gave both managers and investors an incredible 
view into the operations and health of the railroad.
 The creation of annual reports led to many challenges 
for accountants, because they often had to develop account-
ing theory ad hoc. One of the major challenges of this sort for 
railroads was accounting for long-lived fixed assets. Valuing the 
many miles of railroad tracks was difficult for accountants, but 
critically important for managers, since a huge portion of the 
total assets of a railroad were in fixed assets like tracks. Even 
contemporarily, there are many methods of accounting for 
long-lived assets and reporting methods in the United States 
that don’t match with the methods employed by taxing authori-
ties. US GAAP allows for straight-line depreciation, sum-of-the-
year’s-digits, and several other methods. Meanwhile, the IRS 
uses a system called MACRS. 
 Going back over a century, managers had even less prec-
edent or theory to work with. As explained by James Boock-
hodlt, there were several popular methods, each with their own 
pros and cons. It bears to keep in mind that despite the relative 
youth of annual reporting, some of these methods were surpris-
ingly sophisticated and resemble modern accounting standards. 
Three quasi-popular methods included: “periodic revaluation,” 
which was similar to mark-to-market valuation with pretty 
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frequent upward adjustments; an annuity method, which paid 
the annuity in order to create a future fund to pay for the re-
placement of the assets; finally, there was the ‘renewal method,’ 
which was similar to accumulated depreciation and expensed 
the decline of an assets value over time.10 All of these methods 
had advantages and disadvantages, but they achieved something 
significant: expensing the costs of capitalized assets. Overall, the 
development of these methods was evidence of the impressive 
improvements in accounting theory during this period. Admit-
tedly, mid-nineteenth century managers had a level of discretion 
over the creation of their reports that today would be deeply 
unsettling. Despite that, some managers and railroads did pro-
duce high quality reports that attempted to give investors a 
pretty objective view of their property.
 However, some managers were not as noble because 
these expenses could have such a major impact on the bottom 
line of a railroad. Many wanted to be slyer in their expensing 
of capital assets and, in the absence of strict accounting stan-
dards, they could get away with what is today euphemistically 
called “creative accounting”. While some of the methods tried 
to periodically expense some part of their capital assets, most 
firms used “the retirement method of accounting for fixed as-
sets… under this method, the expense due to the exhaustion of 
property was recognized at the time of the retirement of a unit 
of the property.”11 This method ultimately replaced the other 
three as the most popular among managers. The justification for 
this method was that “as long as the property was maintained 
in good repair then no decrease in the value of the asset had 
occurred.” In contemporary business, this accounting theory 
would not be accepted. Depreciation has man12y definitions, 
but economic depreciation is usually characterized as the de-
cline in the future benefits (or cash flows) from the asset due to 
its use that year. These assets had a limited lifespan and would 
eventually need to be replaced, regardless of what amount of 
repair the railroad companies conducted on tracks, engines, 
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and other capital equipment. Therefore, firms should have ac-
counted for this decline with some sort of record of the implied 
expense. For shareholders, this was really dubious accounting; 
the intrinsic value of their equity was the net of assets and li-
abilities. With the retirement method, a railroad track would be 
worth its capitalized costs until the day it was to be retired and 
replaced with new track. Instead of gradual depreciation, on the 
day of retirement investors would be faced with a massive loss 
in the value of their equity in the firm caused by a sudden drop 
in the net value of assets. So, while the accounting justification 
of the method was not very firm, there was another justifica-
tion for its use: retirement accounting was very beneficial for 
management. Through the use of this method, managers could 
boost their bottom line significantly. Furthermore, many states 
set the rates railroads could charge customers, which was often 
done by placing a cap on the railroad’s profit as a percentage of 
its assets. Therefore, a railroad could set higher rates and earn a 
larger profit with a higher asset valuation. In that situation, the 
interests of managers and investors were closely aligned against 
regulators.
 Management’s uses for accounting didn’t end at the cre-
ation of annual reports for investors and regulators. Accounting 
could also enable management to get an analytical and objective 
look at the numbers of their operations. An 1879 treatise writ-
ten by Marshall Kirkman in The Railroad Gazette captures many 
of the managerial uses for accounting and reports. Kirkman was 
a unique authority on the development and codification of rail-
road accounting. He served as the General Accountant and later 
Vice President of the Chicago and North Western Railway, and 
he was also one of the founders of the Accounting Division of 
the American Association of Railroads. In the treatise, Kirkman 
lays out modern accounting theory and practices for other man-
agers and accountants in the industry. He confirms the prevail-
ing standard of two statement accounting, saying both “a gener-
al balance sheet, then, should embrace a clear, concise summary 
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of the liabilities of the company, including its capital stock, also 
the property and assets owned by it” and “the income account” 
which should embrace “the earnings and incidental expense 
accounts of the company” with earnings appearing “upon the 
ledger as a credit balance” and expenses appearing “as debit bal-
ances upon the general ledger” with “the difference or balance 
between the credit and debit” constituting “the Undivided In-
come of the property.”13 More interestingly, he points out that 
accountants and their reports served as vitally important sources 
of information for management in this period, since “to the ig-
norant and unthinking, the various sub-divisions of railway ser-
vice have apparently little or no relation to each other… [but] 
the accountant should possess an intimate knowledge of the mi-
nutiae of the different classes of accounts.”14 His approach is de-
centralized, and he suggests “the returns from agents and others 
are, so far as practicable, allowed to reach the general account-
ing officer through the hands of the department officers and 
division superintendents of the company.”15 He maintained that 
decentralization ensures that middle management becomes far 
more familiar with their operations since “[the] plan enables the 
officers to acquaint themselves generally with the details of their 
several branches of business without requiring special reports.”16 
This use of accounting was significant and valuable to manage-
ment. Managers who were neither able to look into databases 
to see revenue numbers nor access client information were now 
able to view detailed reports of their receipts and operations and 
have an objective view of their true situation.
 Marshall Kirkman was not the only manager who saw 
the potential of detailed annual reports for managerial analysis. 
Albert Fink, the Vice President and General Superintendent of 
the Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad, also 
wrote a treatise on railroad accounting. In his work, Fink clearly 
lays out the importance of detailed and accurate accounting, 
saying:
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           17
 Here, Fink touches on very deep ideas. Fink is coming 
close to writing microeconomic theory, approaching railroad 
management as an in-depth exercise in cost minimization and 
profit maximization. Accounting is central to this managerial 
approach and therefore becomes a powerful manager tool for 
analysis and informed decision making. One of Fink’s annual 
reports composed between the years 1873 and 1874 was even 
included as one of the course readings, which includes some 
of his statistical measures. Fink and other managers developed 
and produced many tables of data and statistics for use by in-
vestors and managers alike. Similar to the statistics used in the 
nascent art of sabermetrics during this period, managers created 
all sorts of interesting ratios and measures. One such statistic 
was a ‘movement expenses per ton-mile’ which is equal to the 
movement expenses per train mile (sourced from their own data 
table) over the average number of tons of freight in each train. 
Combining this with three other measures (station expenses per 
ton-mile, maintenance of road per ton-mile, and interest per 
ton-mile) added up to find the total cost per ton-mile.18 Like a 
baseball manager analyzing a player’s batting average and field-
If the percentage of operating expenses to net earnings, or the 
cost of one ton of freight or one passenger transported one mile, 
can not be used as an absolute measure of economy, or even as a 
measure of comparison, and we have seen it can not, the ques-
tion arises, what is the proper course to pursue in ascertaining 
whether a railroad is economically operated or not?
To this the answer must be given that the only mode of ascer-
taining this fact thoroughly is to make an examination of each 
item of expenditure incurred in the operation of a railroad, and 
see whether this has been reduced to a minimum and the service 
rendered to a maximum… but even that knowledge would be 
of little avail unless the accounts of the operating expenditures 
of railroads are kept in such a manner as to exhibit in detail not 
only the expenditures, but also the amount of work performed 
for each item of expenditures.
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ing percentage, railroad managers could use these measures 
to closely analyze their cost structure. The work of these two 
writers, each important and influential managers of the time, 
highlight just how sophisticated and powerful accounting had 
become. Quickly rising from short memos to investors, annual 
reports eventually became sophisticated and detailed enough to 
enable managers to use them in order to make strategic deci-
sions.   
Shareholders’ Expectations and Frustrations with Financial Re-
ports
  Just like the federal and state governments, private 
investors were very interested in railroads. Similar to the tech 
stocks of the 1990’s into the present, railroads were the exciting 
and disruptive industry of the future during the mid-nineteenth 
century. However, the motivations of private investors obviously 
differed from those of the government. While the government 
sought to promote railroads in order to develop the economy 
of the country and build infrastructure to connect its distant 
regions together, private investors were interested in making 
money from their investment. With this motivation for invest-
ment, private shareholders were deeply interested in the annual 
financial reports of the railroads. These reports were used by 
shareholders to assess the position of the firm and the value of 
their property; a dependable and trustworthy report was the 
only way a shareholder could measure the value of his owner-
ship objectively. Financial reports existed because of government 
requirements and investor demand for them, however, their lack 
of standardization was a source of aggravation. Many managers 
were incentivized, as they still are, to fudge or outright manipu-
late numbers in their annual report to make their firm look like 
a better investment. The variety in methods of reporting and 
the desire of some managers to make inaccurate or fraudulent 
reports meant that the quality of annual reports differed greatly 
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from one report to the next. This was a major issue for inves-
tors, and one that caused a good deal of frustration and fear.
 In an 1879 edition of the North American Review, an 
article entitled “The Mysteries of American Railway Account-
ing” captured many of the contemporary issues that investors 
had with railroad securities. The article zeros in on the lax and 
perhaps fraudulent accounting standards of the New York Cen-
tral Railroad, one of the premier railroads at this time. Investors 
could have forgiven the industry if the managers of some fringe 
regional railroad were making questionable decisions with their 
accounting. Yet, the New York Central, on the other hand, was 
one of the country’s premier railroads. If there were serious is-
sues with this railroad, that would have represented an indict-
ment of the whole industry. 
 The author alleges many issues with the company, start-
ing with a failure of the New York State regulating authorities. 
As the author makes clear, “the laws of New York, which, as 
they now stand, render possible, either the rendering of no 
account whatever of their financial condition, by companies 
whose stocks may constitute the sole means of subsistence of 
otherwise helpless families, or the publishing of such state-
ments, or reports, as are a mockery of the law, and an insult to 
the common sense of every business man.”19 Without proper 
enforcement of some level of quality in financial reporting, 
the state of business in New York would enter into a bad state. 
Honest and objective reporting was critical since “every well-
regulated State very properly undertakes to control many of 
its public corporation, so that, through a perfect knowledge 
of their financial condition, only to be ascertained through 
complete and enforced reports, the public at large may know 
to what extent it is safe to trust their promises to pay, losses, 
interest, or dividends, as the case may be.”20 Because of their 
business, railroads were dependent on the public as a source of 
capital. 
 The erosion of public trust and faith in the honesty of 
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financial reports could threaten the legitimacy of state authori-
ties and honest businesses in New York. However, at the writ-
ing of the article, the demand for New York Central stock was 
healthy as the railroad was able to consistently pay a dividend 
on the stock. The author makes this clear, saying, “for some ten 
years, no perfect “general balance-sheet” has been published by 
the company… instead of awakening the suspicions of brokers 
and investors, [this] seems to have been entirely ignored. The 
market price of the stock has been governed by the fact that it 
has paid eight per cent dividends, regardless of the absence of 
any proof of its intrinsic value, as indicated by the existence 
of a due proportion of assets to liabilities.”21 Just like contem-
porary bubbles and accounting scandals, investors were either 
uninterested in any problems with annual reports, despite their 
objective importance, or were unaware of these issues with New 
York Central’s accounting. This yields a significant observation: 
regulation was critically important, for the public often did not 
review annual reports closely as long as superficial indicators of 
success like dividends were present.
 Despite some investors’ ignorance about dubious re-
porting, railroads companies were still very sensitive to public 
doubts about their securities. The impact of the New York Re-
view article was damning on the railroad industry as a whole, 
and it certainly was not the only place such opinions could have 
been found. Enough public doubt in the industry could have 
led to a severe drop in the share prices of firms across the na-
tion. Yet beyond the dubious or potentially fraudulent annual 
reports of the New York Central, the accounting methods used 
in formulating such annual reports of many other railroads 
could also easily lead to public distrust. As discussed earlier, 
conventions such as the retirement method for valuing long-
lived fixed assets produced annual reports that kept in mind 
only the interests of the management, rather than those of the 
stockholders. The management of an individual firm was often 
deeply interested in dispelling any doubts about the value of 
the property behind their own firm’s stocks, especially if these 
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doubts were already being vocalized by stockholders.
 In response to the fear of shareholders in their firm, 
the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
launched a committee, headed by William Stokely, the Mayor 
of Philadelphia, to investigate its accounts and perform a full 
audit of their balance sheet. Made in response to complaints 
from stockholders, its explicit goal was to “meeting to examine 
all the property of the Company… to make an appraisement 
of the value of the roads, shops, machinery, real estate, depots, 
bonds, stocks, and all other assets of the Company; also, to 
examine into the liabilities and obligations of the Company.”22 
Similar to the use of annual reports to generate insightful sta-
tistics for management, this committee also attempted to in-
vestigate “the wisdom of the past policy of your Company, and 
to make any suggestions that we may deem likely to conduce 
to its greater prosperity in the future.”23 Therefore management 
could use the report along with shareholders in order to better 
understand the realities of their operations. As always, accurate 
reporting could benefit both groups, since objective measure-
ments of the operation allows both investors and managers to 
make strategic decisions regarding the company.
 The committee quickly proved itself to be much more 
than a public relations stunt from the board through the clear 
repudiation of several decisions of the firm. For instance, the 
committee removed a several million-dollar investment in the 
United New Jersey Railroad and Canal Company from their 
balance sheet because it was a “mythical account” which was 
neither “part of the assets or liabilities of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road Company.”24 Apparently, this investment was really the 
property of a New Jersey railroad from which the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company leased railroad lines. Whether this mistake 
was intentional or unintentional is unclear and the committee 
doesn’t make a great effort to investigate this, preferring correc-
tion over investigation. 
 The committee also specifically mentions several costly 
mistakes made by management over the years. The report zeros 
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in on a group of investments on railroad lines south of Balti-
more. The Pennsylvania Railroad focused its operations mainly 
in the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest, so expansion southwards 
was a move out of the norm for the firm. This expansion re-
sulted in failure, with the revenues from the lines barely break-
ing past the operating expenses incurred. The committee held 
nothing back in their criticism of the management’s decision to 
expand, stating that “in making investments south of Baltimore 
without your consent, by which nearly $5,000,000 have been 
lost to your Company.”25 However, the committee immediately 
sought to rebuild the confidence of its shareholders, point-
ing out that this loss “illustrates the dangers against which we 
endeavor to guard, as explained in other parts of this report.”26 
Through open admission of the mistakes and an effort in the 
report to explain methods to avoid another mistake like this in 
the future, the committee attempted to win back stockholder 
confidence not just in their reports but also their operations. 
Overall, it is impressive to see the committee attempting to 
win back stockholder confidence by cleaning up past mistakes 
and proposing methods to avoid future mistakes. Many other 
firms would have not had the same integrity to correct for past 
mistakes. The zealous efforts of the committee demonstrates 
the Board of Directors’ devotion to its fiduciary duty. Any past 
mistakes made by management could be corrected by the com-
mittee, with shareholders associating the governance of the firm 
more with the committee than with the management.
 It is apparent that investor confidence in the veracity 
and accuracy of annual reports was shaky at best. Especially for 
more business savvy investors, the methods of assembling an-
nual reports could often be seen as unsatisfactory as it could be 
difficult to divine the true value of an investment in a firm from 
their financial reports. While many firms attempted to remedy 
this through investigation committees like that of the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company, these efforts were perhaps unneces-
sary. Overall, it seems that the regular payment of dividends was 
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the most important factor in winning investors over, regardless 
of whether such dividends were sustainable. The author of “The 
Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” was an accountant, 
or at least anonymously claimed to be one, so naturally as a pro-
fessional he was able to zero in on issues in the New York Cen-
tral’s financial reports. Laymen investors who were less able to 
interpret annual reports, let alone tease out discrepancies, would 
have been less sensitive about their quality so long as such is-
sues were not directly brought to their attention. This highlights 
both the importance of honest management and firm regula-
tors, both then and now. Through a combination of the two, 
business would remain in high repute, and people of all stripes 
could participate in corporate ownership.
Conclusion
 The accounting practices of the railroad industry in the 
mid-nineteenth century were truly remarkable in both for their 
sophistication and rapid development. Prior to the railroads, 
businesses were never expected to release any sort of substan-
tial reports. The business of railroads required not only large 
numbers of investors and creditors but also an unprecedented 
amount of equity and debt. The demand of the investors even-
tually led to the demand for annual reports. Furthermore, the 
federal and state governments, heavily invested in the railroad 
business and interested in overseeing their operations, required 
annual reports to be made to supervise over the railroads’ 
status and operations. Thus, both the state and private inves-
tors demanded annual reports as evidence of the value of their 
property. Coincidentally, the development of railroads as large 
and sophisticated corporations was mirrored by the evolution 
of their annual reports from brief letters to comprehensive and 
sophisticated documents. Beyond the demand from govern-
ments and private investors, managers also used accounting and 
annual reports as an opportunity to analyze their operations and 
gain a better strategic understanding of their firm’s positions.
Penn History Review     78 
American Railroad Accounting Practices
 Although railroads declined in national importance with 
the rise of cars, trucks, and planes, they had lasting impacts on 
American business. Other corporations adopted and expanded 
on the model of railroads, and their corporate organizations and 
practices were highly influenced by them. With that in mind, 
these annual reports are especially significant. They not only of-
fer critical insights into the relationships of firms, investors, and 
regulators in the 1870’s, but they also have significant implica-
tions on how those relationships are formed even today.
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